Lay Perspectives on Marriage and the Family by Knieps-Port le Roi, Thomas
 Intams review 20, 169-174. doi: 10.2143/int.00.0.0000000 169
 © 2014 by intams review. all rights reserved
Thomas Knieps-Port le Roi
Lay Perspectives on Marriage and the Family 
Introduction into the Colloquium 
“One of the most unsettling issues in the 
 contemporary church is the unabated discrep-
ancy between the official teaching on matters of 
sexual and conjugal morality and the way people 
shape and organize their sexual, marital and fam-
ily life. Church officials often address this gap 
by merely condemning undesirable departures 
from traditional Christian morality.” Possibly, 
this analysis written in the invitation leaflet to 
this colloquium will soon have to be revised. 
On 8 October 2013 Pope Francis called for two 
assemblies of the synod of Bishops to be held 
in 2014 and in 2015 to discuss “the pastoral 
challenges of the family in the context of evan-
gelization”. this happens “only” thirty years 
after the previous synod on the Family and its 
condensation in Familiaris consortio, which so 
far we were told to regard as a kind of “magna 
Charta” of Catholic teaching on marriage and 
the family. as part of the bargain, the Vatican 
has asked the world’s bishops to distribute among 
their pastors and faithful a “questionnaire” and 
to report back to Rome how the teaching on 
issues such as contraception, unmarried cohabi-
tation, same-sex marriage and divorce has been 
received in the local churches. should the mag-
isterium really have understood that its teaching 
on these issues and the practice of many, faithful 
Catholics have dramatically drifted apart over the 
past decades?
Whatever will become of this questionnaire 
and the synodal assemblies that it is supposed to 
prepare for, the pope’s initiative has given addi-
tional topicality and relevance to our colloquium. 
the cleavage between the magisterial teaching 
and Catholics’ sexual and relational behaviour 
has become a commonplace for which sufficient 
scientific evidence has been provided by now. 
For instance, in 2010 and 2012 the Centre for 
marriage and Family studies (Zentralinstitut 
für Ehe und Familie in der Gesellschaft) at the 
Catholic University Eichstätt-ingolstadt in Ger-
many carried out a survey (Jugendwertstudie) 
among 300 Catholic adolescents (between the 
age of 16 and 21) and their parents in which the 
value orientations and attitudes of these young-
sters with regard to marriage, sexuality, family 
and partnership were compared with the attitudes 
of average teenagers in the German population.1 
While these young Catholics have a relatively 
strong religious value orientation along with 
a preference for a traditional type of family 
– which makes the researchers believe that they 
are still from a catholic milieu –, they do not 
differ from their non-Catholic peers when it 
comes to issues of sexuality and partnerships. 
Like their average peers, they have been sexually 
active (44% indicated that they have had sexual 
intercourse), they use contraceptives and, like 
most of their parents, they do not reject pre-
marital sex (only 4% of the adolescents and 8% 
of their parents are strictly against sex before 
marriage). in her conclusion, the author of the 
study confirms that the hypothesis of a “discrep-
ancy” can be verified since “the ecclesiastical 
orientation parameters in the realm of sexuality 
increasingly veer away from the way of life that 
1 see http://www.ku.de/forschungseinr/zfg/forschungs- 
projekte/jugendwertstudie/; accessed 24-11-2014.
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is practiced by and accepted as guiding action 
for the faithful”.2
so far church officials seemed to presume that 
the problem is situated almost exclusively at the 
level of the faithful themselves who are unwilling 
or unable to follow the moral law in their indi-
vidual lives and relationships. in her long history, 
the church has of course constantly been con-
fronted with smaller or larger numbers of their 
faithful who did not comply with the sometimes 
lofty moral ideals that were suggested to or 
imposed on them. a proven remedy to deal with 
human weakness and sinfulness in pastoral prac-
tice was confession and the sacrament of penance. 
Ethically, “deviant behaviour” of Christians that 
contradicted the objective moral norm could be 
“excused” to some degree by pointing to the 
moral fragility of concrete persons and to the 
boundaries of free and responsible human action. 
in this way the Catechism of the Catholic Church 
still upholds that the “imputability and respon-
sibility for an action can be diminished or even 
nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, 
habit, inordinate attachments and other psycho-
logical and social factors”.3 
in the present situation, however, “deviant 
sexual behaviour” and “irregular relational life-
styles” have not only massively been increasing 
among Catholics. What is more striking and 
alarming is that people no longer regard their 
deviance as aberration from and infringement of 
the moral law. the problem is thus no longer 
the gap between value and action but much more 
fundamentally the divergence between what 
Catholics discern as being morally good or bad 
and what the church teaches to be the moral 
norm. although this is not true for every issue 
– with regard to adultery, rape and incest for 
instance most Christians would concur with the 
moral judgement of the church –, it is for central 
issues such as contraception and remarriage that 
have dominated the debates among Catholics 
over the past decades and it undoubtedly will be 
in the future with regard to same-sex unions. to 
put it bluntly: while in the past the problem has 
been one of practice lagging behind the theory, 
it is for some time now theory itself that is put 
into question.
Over the past decades moral theologians have 
lucidly registered and analysed the situation. in 
their diagnosis many of them have come to the 
conclusion that indeed something is wrong with 
the “theory”, at least with the way the magiste-
rium establishes, expresses and conveys the moral 
norm. they have spotted a number of meth-
odological flaws, such as 
 – the magisterium’s reference to natural law 
which is largely uninformed by scientific 
insights and presumes that human nature can 
be identified with biological finalities, without 
taking into consideration that human reason 
plays an essential role in the knowledge of 
nature as well as in the historical, cultural, and 
social shaping of that nature;4 
 – or a moral discernment that is unduly centred 
on the isolated individual act while neglecting 
the complexity of each human person being 
created in the image of God, going through 
different phases of physical and personal 
maturation, and being called to realize the 
relational character of human sexuality;5
 – or a morality that focuses predominantly on 
prohibitions and tells people what not to do 
(in a list ranging from masturbation, contra-
ception, and homosexual acts to divorce and 
adultery), while failing to provide any tools 
that might help them to come to terms with 
their sexuality and to build up authentic and 
trustworthy relationships.
mainstream Catholic moral theologians have also 
criticized inadequate thematic emphases in the 
church’s teaching on marriage and the family. 
a first “fixation” is on marriage as the moral 
norm for all sexual relations. since the 1970’s 
non-marital cohabitation has become a wide-
spread and culturally accepted form of living 
together, mainly for adolescents and young 
adults. From empirical research we know that 
there are different types of cohabitants. some do 
not see themselves in a position to get married 
immediately; some want to get to know the part-
ner better, test the relationship and experience 
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far, however, this has been without much success, 
since the magisterium has shown hardly any flex-
ibility when it comes to what it claims to be the 
unalterable doctrine of the church. One may 
wonder whether the time has come to look for 
a new starting point in Christian sexual, conjugal 
and family ethics, a starting point that does not 
pass over what eminent scholars have elaborated 
during the past decades but that suspends for a 
moment their primary question of whether “the 
moral theory has got it right”. What about look-
ing more closely at the “practice”, learning from 
people “on the ground” why they shape their 
relational and sexual lives the way they do, what 
things matter to them and why they do, what 
values they discern in their direct experiences7 
– with the partner they live together with with-
out committing themselves in a definitive way, 
in view of contraceptive means they may or may 
the practice of daily living together; others do 
not want to commit themselves in a definite way. 
Only a minority of them strictly refuses (later) 
marriage. and we know also that most of these 
unions are not void of any moral responsibility 
and that the partners often share in the marital 
ideals of partnership, faithfulness, and exclusivity. 
it is equally known that the expectations for an 
enduring partnership are much higher today than 
in the past and that also the fragility of relation-
ships and the risk of failure have increased. Can 
one then claim in an undifferentiated way, as the 
Catechism does, that “[a]ll these situations offend 
against the dignity of marriage; they destroy the 
very idea of the family; they weaken the sense 
of fidelity. they are contrary to the moral law. 
the sexual act must take place exclusively within 
marriage. Outside of marriage it always constitutes 
a grave sin and excludes one from sacramental 
communion”?6
a second problem that theologians have 
addressed is the magisterium’s insistence on pro-
creation as the main purpose of sexuality. after 
Gaudium et spes had attempted to overcome the 
canonical perspective of viewing marriage pri-
marily as an institution for the procreation and 
education of children, the authors of Humanae 
vitae reinstated that an openness to procreation 
must be attached to each and every marital sexual 
act, which excluded almost every practical means 
of regulating fertility. Only a few people would 
deny that a meaningful sexual relationship ideally 
goes along with the openness to children. But under 
today’s conditions establishing and maintaining 
a stable sexual partnership and the bearing of 
offspring are spread over subsequent stages in a 
life course which each require a conscientious 
decision to enter into a new phase of life. should 
the openness to children then not be seen much 
more as a chance to strengthen the partners’ 
commitment rather than as a precondition for 
entering a sexual relationship?
all these matters have intensely been discussed 
over the past 45 years – with great erudition, with 
compelling arguments and often also with great 
dedication from the side of Catholic ethicists. so 
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relationship but i do not have access to the pri-
mary experience of the couple itself when they 
perceive, or do not perceive, their sexual relation-
ship as something valuable and morally good. 
Here lies another, deeper layer of value experi-
ence which the moral theologian should also 
attend to. and it is here that ultimately the 
notion of “lay” comes in. i will try to illustrate 
this by way of a short excursus.
the chapter on marriage and the family in 
the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes of the 
second Vatican Council appears to the attentive 
reader as a strange compromise between two dif-
ferent theological approaches. Whenever it refers 
to marriage as being “established by the Creator 
and qualified with his laws”, “endowed…with 
various benefits and purposes” which all “have a 
very decisive bearing on the continuation of the 
human race” and finally stipulates that marriage 
is “ordained for the procreation and education 
of children”9, one is reminded of the overly 
juridical and institutional approach that charac-
terized the pre-conciliar conception of marriage. 
the perspective here is that of an external spec-
tator who looks down on the married couple 
from an elevated position. What he sees there is 
a natural order, providentially arranged by God 
in which couples have their place to assume and 
their role to play, i.e. to produce offspring for 
the propagation of the human race. But then 
there is also that other approach in the text when 
it talks about the “intimate partnership of mar-
ried life and love”, about “a man and a woman 
who…render mutual help and service to each 
other through an intimate union of their persons 
and their actions” and thus “experience the 
meaning of their oneness”10. We have left here 
the external observer’s position and find ourselves 
next to any average couple. What we see there is 
no longer a pre-established harmonious order but 
married life in close-up view: two spouses pri-
marily concerned with the well-being of their 
relationship, which the text refers to as the “good 
of the spouses” (bonum coniugum). the so-called 
personalist turn in the theology of marriage 
brings us much closer to the reality of married 
not use, with regard to the children they may or 
may not desire, in a same-sex relationship etc. 
and it may be that Pope Francis’ new initiative 
provides the opportunity and free space to move 
in that direction. 
Catholic moral theology has recognized the 
role of human experience as a source of moral 
discernment next to scripture, tradition, and 
other disciplines of knowledge. What that means 
and how experience “works” in moral reasoning 
can perhaps best be illustrated with regard to 
issues which our moral reasoning has not yet 
come to terms with. take the case of homosexu-
ality. if i turn to the church tradition and to the 
bible, i will not find much evidence to convince 
me that homosexual acts are morally defendable 
or even good. after going through some more 
recent philosophical and theological literature, 
i may even be inclined to believe that being a 
human person means being a male or a female 
interdependently and not independently and that 
the difference of the two sexes is therefore fun-
damental to a fulfilling sexual life. my negative 
stance may, however, topple if i happen to have 
close friends who live in a loving, faithful and 
exclusive same-sex relationship. From observation 
and conversation with them, the insight may 
 gradually grow in me that this couple does not lack 
anything essential to living a meaningful and ful-
filling relationship. the encounter with this couple 
and thus direct experience leads me to discover a 
real human value in the homosexual relationship. 
and if this new insight continues to persuade me 
and to hold true, it will ultimately function as a 
measure against which i will test scripture, 
church tradition and other informed positions.
Experience is thus a source for the moral 
theologian as it “gives special hope of finding 
new evidence, for experience is created by the 
here and now and therefore is especially open to 
the new insights that surface […] at given times 
and places”.8 But what i have described in the 
above case as “my experience” is in some way 
only a “second-hand” or “vicarious experience”. 
“i” – being a male heterosexual – have experi-
enced a real value in the homosexual couple’s 
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of the intimate loving union – have irreversibly 
gone, the relationship has lost its foundation and 
the marriage has died. most bishops and theo-
logians at the council would certainly not have 
approved of this stance.
the question then is which and whose expe-
riences can justifiably be admitted into our 
theological and ethical discourse, and which 
ones have to be excluded, and if so, on what 
grounds? i cannot go here into the many intrica-
cies that this question conjures up for the meth-
odology of Christian ethics. my short-circuit 
answer is that we should carefully listen to and 
take seriously first-hand experiences however 
incompatible with a Christian view they may 
appear at first sight. 
the first reason is that experience can allow 
new evidence to surface here and now which 
abstract theories don’t. We are all hermeneuti-
cally versed enough to acknowledge that experi-
ence is never pure or innocent but always shaped 
by the theoretical frameworks and worldviews 
which render it possible in the first instance. But 
still, “it is experience itself that has taught us: 
the worldviews that shape experience can be chal-
lenged and in some respects modified and even 
overturned. the hermeneutical circle is not so 
tightly shut that we are denied a critical edge or 
opening.”11
the second reason for my plea in favour of a 
wide range of experiences to be admitted in 
moral theology is that experiential evidence is 
much more connected with the interior, subjec-
tive, personal and private character of our knowl-
edge and forms thus an indispensable counter-
weight to the theoretical evidence with its claim 
life and the experiences of the couple. Down here 
priorities are clearly different, with the quality of 
the interpersonal relationship taking precedence 
over the relevance of offspring for society and 
church (bonum prolis).
Luckily, the majority of the council fathers 
were sensitive and clear-sighted enough to realize 
that the remote institutional vision of the pre-
conciliar period would no longer appeal to the 
mentality of contemporary people, neither out-
side nor inside the church. so they suspended 
the former approach and agreed that the experi-
ences many of them had gained in their pastoral 
ministry with married couples should be given a 
voice in the church’s discourse on marriage. they 
did what i did when i allowed my experiences 
with my befriended homosexual couple to influ-
ence my moral judgment. and just as from that 
moment on i looked differently on homosexual 
relations, they took a different view on marriage. 
the similarities stretch even further. i mentioned 
above that my experience with same-sex relations 
has been a vicarious experience since i cannot 
place myself in the position of homosexual part-
ners. the same is true for the conciliar text which 
recognizes the spousal life as a valuable source 
for theological insight but does not lend its voice 
directly to individual couples. the council’s will-
ingness to admit marital experiences into its the-
ology has gone far, but not that far. in the end, 
couples would have to make out for themselves 
whether “intimate partnership of married life and 
love” or “marital covenant” were categories in 
which they could recognize themselves. For sure, 
lived married life is always much richer than 
these abstract theological conceptualizations sug-
gest – but it can also run up against the bound-
aries of such conceptual frameworks. the fierce 
debates about divorce and remarriage in the post-
conciliar period have shown that the council 
fathers had indeed opened a Pandora’s Box when 
favouring the personalist view over the older jurid-
ical one. What happened was that experience 
“taught” some couples, whose relationships had 
broken up, that once love and commitment – 
according to Gaudium et spes the core elements 
Intams review 20 (2014)
174
12 see i. Bocken’s article “Who is a Layman? Historical 
and Philosophical Perspectives on the ‘idiota’/‘Laicus’” 
in this issue.
opposed to public – affairs. the “lay” perspective 
is therefore the perspective of the “insider”, the 
one who knows from within and therefore better 
than anyone else. the risk that is inherent in this 
figure is that if one fails to go beyond one’s own 
horizon and to “exteriorise” or “objectify” one’s 
very knowledge, which means to communicate 
one’s insights to others, one becomes in the lit-
eral sense an “idiot”, one who cannot make him-
self understandable to others.12
the lay perspective on marriage which Vati-
can ii has undoubtedly strengthened over against 
the expertise of the distanced theologian and 
canonist thus provides the most immediate and 
most intimate view of the loving relationship, 
and it is hard to believe that church officials will 
ever again be able to rule it out – not only because 
of the emancipative power with which the “laity” 
today claims the right for their own view, but 
above all because of the proper insight it brings 
to the Christian understanding of the marital 
union. the church’s ongoing struggle for a greater 
involvement of the laity is not about admitting 
more lay persons to positions previously held by 
clerics or religious; it is mainly about allowing 
the “lay perspective” to gain ground in theology, 
discipline, and religious practice. 
to further explore where such lay perspectives 
on sexuality, marriage and the family can be 
detected and how they can be strengthened is 
the main purpose of this colloquium.
of objectivity and universal validity. if i under-
stand marriage to be a juridical institution which 
infallibly guards the couple against the individ-
ual’s weakness and arbitrariness, i do not care 
about the imponderabilities of  interpersonal 
relationships and of conjugal love because these 
are simply out of my range of vision. the per-
spective i assume or choose in this case is that of 
the external spectator who takes his distance from 
what he observes or describes. Objectivity is only 
warranted if i can look at a thing or event from 
all possible angles; this presupposes an elevated 
position. But once i leave or lose the observer’s 
position and find myself in the messiness of lived 
reality, my perspective and – as we have seen – 
my priorities become different. Once i have lost 
sight of the objective framework of the marital 
institution, i may experience the relationship as 
vulnerable and fragile, even to the point of 
renouncing any idea of indissolubility as sense-
less or false. my position and perspective has 
become a “subjective” one which our common 
understanding immediately (dis)qualifies as lim-
ited because others will possibly view things dif-
ferently. But still, who would deny that i get to 
see something here that remains hidden from an 
objective point of view?
the two positions or perspectives could also 
be described as that of the expert/specialist who 
keeps the overview on the one side and that of 
the layperson on the other. the Latin term laicus 
for layman was also rendered as idiota, deriving 
from the Greek idiotes (“person lacking profes-
sional skill”) and idios (“private”, “one’s own”) 
and thus refers to someone who is concerned 
almost exclusively with personal or private – as 
